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This paper examines a unique aspect of Congressional history centering on the 
passage of the 17th amendment in 1913, which shifted the power of U.S. Senate elections 
from the state legislature to state electorates.  This paper examines how the passage of the 
amendment affected the relationship between characteristics of the state electorate and 
the roll call behavior of U.S. Senators.  Due to the historical nature of the time period, I 
use Presidential election results by state, party control of the governorship and upper and 
lower chambers of the state legislature, as well as a number of demographic variables, to 
estimate each state’s mass ideology.  Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores are 
also used to determine the liberal-conservative positions of Senators during this time 
period.  Regression and pooled cross-sectional time-series models are utilized to test the 
hypotheses.  I find that legislators, after the passage of the 17th amendment, become more 
apt to take the policy views of their constituents into account when voting. I also find 
evidence that Senators are more conservative in states where conservative elites are 




The linkage between constituents and representatives has been a major scholarly 
focus of political scientists for decades (Weissberg, 1979; Wright, 1989 and Hill and 
Hurley, 1999 provide just a few examples).  Throughout this time period, political 
scientists have grappled extensively with measurement challenges and the difficulties 
posed by competing theories in the literature (Stone, 1979; Ardoin and Garand, 2003; 
LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997; Kuklinski, 1977; Miller and Stokes, 1963 and Erickson 
1978).  Though this relationship has been studied in many different ways, few scholars 
have studied representation from a historical standpoint.  The purpose of this paper is to 
examine how the passage of the 17th Amendment affected legislative roll-call 
responsiveness to state constituencies.  I explore how the movement from an indirect to a 
direct method of election affects the level of representation in the Senate.  In order to do 
this, I collect data on each state’s mass ideology (using presidential election returns, 
governor and state legislature party control estimates and census data) and each Senator’s 
ideological position (using Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE scores).  I estimate a 
series of regression and pooled cross-sectional time-series models to take advantage of 
this natural experiment in the Senate across the time period from the 51st Congress (1889-
1891) to the 76th Congress (1939-1941).  My goal is to explore whether senators become 
more attentive to their constituencies over time and particularly after the passage of the 
17th amendment in 1913.  I expect some level of senatorial responsiveness prior to the 
ratification of the 17th amendment given that the state legislatures were appointing these 
officeholders and this institution was a popularly elected body.  Given this, I assume that 
the public had an indirect effect on the outcome of these senate appointments and could 
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vote out incumbent legislators who appointed senators that did not meet with the public’s 
approval.   
Historical Background 
 The framers designed the Constitution with the implicit intent to control minority 
and majority factions as much as possible (Edwards, Wattenberg and Lineberry, 2002).  
This was accomplished through a system of checks and balances, a separation of powers 
and by limiting majority control.  Over time, the Constitution has become increasingly 
democratized as amendments have expanded the eligible voting population while 
providing opportunities for the public to vote for more officials then was originally 
intended.  The 17th amendment was just one of these democratizing elements.  
The appeal of an amendment mandating popular election of U.S. senators grew as 
the public became increasingly dissatisfied with the way their legislators were being 
selected.   The prevailing appointment process was centered in the state legislatures 
where several problems occurred, including: decision deadlocks resulting in long 
vacancies, interference with legislative business and policymaking, bribery and 
corruption during the selection process, and the accusation that some appointees were 
neglecting their constituency obligations and misrepresenting the state’s partisan interests 
(Haynes, 1938).   
This compilation of problems sparked a movement among state legislatures, the 
U.S. House, and the public to reform the electoral process by creating a system of popular 
election of senators.  By 1905 32 state legislatures had taken some form of formal action 
by advocating the amendment to Congress (Haynes, 1906).  In addition, California, 
Nevada and Illinois all conducted successful referenda on the popular election of 
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Senators (Haynes, 1906).  Some states also created constitutional amendments or new 
laws that allowed for the popular election of senators via direct party primaries. However, 
it was not until the amendment’s ratification that official mandatory reform occurred 
uniformly across the United States.  Starting in 1913, state legislatures no longer had the 
power to appoint representatives, as this authority was bestowed upon the public.  From 
that point forward, all Senate vacancies were filled through direct popular elections.  This 
change brought an end to the 18-year battle within the United States House to reform the 
system for selecting Senators (Crook and Hibbing, 1997). 
 This historical change created a flurry of conjectures from journalists and 
incumbent Senators regarding what the ensuing period would bring for the institutional 
body and the democratic process.  Not surprisingly, many Senators were against the 
amendment’s passage and voiced their hostility openly (Crook and Hibbing, 1997).  Such 
a major change could spell political ruin for Senators who were used to being appointed 
and not elected.  Nevertheless, others supported the amendment, believing it could 
revamp the political system as it stood and bring about the sort of reforms that some 
equate to modern day term limits.   
 So, which outlook was more accurate?  Did the 17th amendment turn out to be a 
bane or a boon for representation?  The answer to this question has remained largely a 
mystery as little systematic or empirical analysis has been conducted for this time period.  
This paper sets out to rectify that shortcoming by examining the representative-
constituent linkage after the passage of the 17th amendment through regression and 





 At the heart of the discussion on the representative-constituency linkage is the 
assumption of responsiveness.  Responsiveness has taken on different interpretations 
throughout the literature but perhaps the most basic notion is that of “a meaningful 
connection between constituency policy preferences or demands and the representative’s 
official behavior (Eulau and Karps, 1977).”  As can be seen by the context of this 
characterization, this relationship is usually defined within the realm of policy 
production.  However, this responsiveness can take on a number of forms.  
Representatives can serve informational, distributional, policy oriented and symbolic 
roles for their individual constituencies, as well as for their respective districts.   
Officeholders are visible, powerful connectors between their constiuents and the 
sometimes-uncharitable waters of government bureaucracy.  This type of responsiveness 
can range from routine service, such as, responding to constituency mail and arranging 
tours to complex casework that might involve handling delays, job placement or program 
facilitation (Eulau and Karps, 1977).  Once elected, many officeholders feel this type of 
service-oriented responsiveness is part of their Congressional responsibility.   
Representatives are also engaged in pork-barrel politics throughout their tenure in 
office.  Stein and Bickers (1995) discuss the electoral connection between particularized 
and distributive benefits and votes.  This presumed connection has led officeholders to 
engage in logrolling and credit claiming in an effort to maintain or secure greater 
electoral marginality and reelection probability.  It has also meant bankable projects, 
grants and various infrastructures for the members of the district to use and enjoy. 
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   Perhaps least noted are the representative’s efforts to maintain a good image or 
level of trust with the public by using certain symbolic gestures or actions.  In Home 
Style, Fenno (1978) documents the behavior of Congressmen in their home districts.  This 
is just one example of the connection representatives seek to create between themselves 
and the voters.  In establishing an aura of public responsiveness and good will throughout 
their terms in office members may hope to increase their chances of reelection via their 
finely and carefully crafted image. 
 Finally, officeholders work to create public policy that will provide a name for 
them both nationally and locally.  But, some scholarly literature has called into question 
just how closely the member should, and does, follow the viewpoints of those he/she 
represents when crafting the legislation.   
Often, responsiveness is examined over the duration of an officeholder’s career 
(Luttbeg, 1992 and Stratmann, 2000) or in terms of a specific policy arena (Mishler and 
Campbell, 1978 and Weber and Shaffner, 1972).  Other studies postulate that 
responsiveness is a result of something specific such as ballot initiatives (Lascher, Hagen 
and Rochlin, 1996), term limits (Carey, Niemi and Powell, 1998) or redistricting (Glazer 
and Robbins, 1985 and Gelman and King, 1994).  What all of these studies have in 
common is a contemporary outlook on the question of representation.  Unfortunately, to 
date, the literature on representation has largely failed to account for historical dynamics 
or events that might affect the relationship between an officeholder and its constituency.    
One of the most documented theories on legislative responsiveness is found in the 
work of Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson (1962).  These authors examine the 
various roles that officeholders play using data from four state legislatures.  Of these 
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roles, the most familiar are that of delegate and trustee.  The delegate theory of 
representation argues that a member is a representative of the people and, as such, he/she 
should represent the ideas and wishes of the district in their creation of public policy.  On 
the other side of the debate, is the trustee theory of representation which argues that 
public officials have the trust of those who put them into office and, as a result, they are 
given the authority to make decisions and policy that they feel is best for the district, even 
if the constituents feel differently (Eulau and Karps, 1977; see also Erikson, 1978). 
 Miller and Stokes (1963) take this notion of policy control a step further by 
adding conditions of constituency influence into the framework.  The first means of 
influence comes when a district elects a representative who holds the same policy views 
as the constituency.  Here, a member of Congress is seen as following the will of the 
public not because they have influenced the officeholder’s decision-making process but 
because the officeholder’s views are so much a feature of his/her districts that they can’t 
help but follow the will of their constituents a majority of the time.  The second means of 
influence is more direct.  Here, legislators may deviate from their explicit will, at least 
some of the time, in order to please the voters and have a better chance at reelection. 
 Legislators provide varying degrees of responsiveness to their constituencies.  
Some legislators are seen as particularly attentive to the policy views of those in their 
district while others seem to have more leeway in their behavior.  An abundance of 
literature has been produced in an effort to describe why this is so.  Explanations have 
included electoral proximity (Thomas, 1985), electoral marginality (Kuklinski, 1977) 
redistricting effects (Glazer and Robbins, 1985), clarity of policy signaling (Ardoin and 
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Garand, 2003), political engagement (education) of constituency (Ardoin and Garand, 
2003), and characteristics of the electorate (Wright, 1989), among others.   
 Besides these variables, variation in representative’s response levels can be 
partially explained by the degree to which various actors have some level of influence 
over a Congressman’s decision-making process.  Outside of a representative’s individual 
policy beliefs and those of his/her constituency, their fellow Congressmen, interest 
groups, staff members, party leaders and the President, can influence a representative 
(Kingdon, 1989).  If a bill is particularly controversial, salient or complex, a member may 
rely heavily on some of these forces to the exclusion of others in an effort to make the 
most appropriate decision.   
As one can see, a great body of scholarly research has been produced on the 
linkage between representatives and constituents in general.  However, there has been 
very little investigation into what effects, if any, the 17th Amendment had on that linkage. 
Given that elections provide an incentive for legislators to be responsive to their 
constituents I would expect the amendment to have a significant effect on representation 
levels.  Further, there has been very little research produced on this topic prior to the 
1950’s.  Thus, it’s important to analyze whether more modern day methodological 
approaches for measuring constituency ideology will remain adequate proxies during the 









In this paper, I argue that the relationship between state constituent ideology and 
senate roll-call behavior will strengthen after the passage of the 17th amendment and 
direct popular election.  Introducing an election condition and making it a stable political 
attribute is crucial to assumptions of representation and responsiveness because it holds 
officeholders accountable to the public.  Regular elections give the voters a voice and a 
chance to elect a challenger to office they feel will better represent their interests.  At the 
same time, once an election condition is established officeholders are confronted with 
strong electoral incentives to respond to the needs of their constituents.  When 
officeholders must weigh the potential electoral costs of apathy against the benefits of 
attentiveness they are likely to choose the latter in the hopes of being elected or reelected.  
No longer are these officeholders beholden to the whims of the legislative elite.  Now, 
they must concern themselves with appealing to the masses.      
 In each state, the level of agitation for the amendment varied among citizens, 
Congressmen and state legislatures.  Intuitively, it seems reasonable to assume that 
senators who hail from states who were active in the fight for the amendment’s passage 
would be more concerned with representation then those who come from states where 
agitation is at dismal levels.  Senators who are surrounded with a climate of activism and 
change may see the amendment as an impending phenomenon and make an effort to 
adjust their behavior before its passage in order to survive in the future.        
There are a number of theories to support the notion that officeholders will be 
attentive to their constituents, especially under certain circumstances.  Few scholars 
would disagree that legislators are concerned with reelection.  This concern has borne 
8 
 
two prominent explanations in the political science literature to account for why 
legislators would willingly choose to be responsive to their electorate.  The most 
prominent explanations are electoral proximity and electoral marginality.   
 The theory of electoral proximity argues that Senators will tend to modify their 
voting behavior prior to an election.  Officeholders shift ideologically because they 
believe their more recent votes are the most likely to be remembered by the voters and 
that the voters will be more attentive to what they are doing when an election is near 
(Thomas, 1985).  But which direct are officeholders likely to shift?  Elling (1982) argues 
that Senators will shift towards “the mean ideological position of all Senators” while 
Thomas contends that Senators are more likely to move in the direction of whomever the 
constituency perceives as their electoral opponents (Thomas, 1985, pp. 109).   
In a related vein, the theory of electoral marginality argues that officeholders will 
be more representative when they hail from competitive districts and face stiff electoral 
competition on a regular basis (Kuklinski, 1977).  It has been argued, that an officeholder 
who maintains a large margin of victory in their most recent election will be more apt to 
exhibit party loyalty over constituency concerns.  On the other hand, if an officeholder is 
not electorally secure they are more likely to pay attention to the desires of their 
constituency and vote accordingly.   
 
For the purposes of this research paper, I offer the following research question 
and hypotheses: 
 
RQ:  How did the 17th Amendment affect legislative roll-call responsiveness to 









H1: Legislative responsiveness will increase as a result of Senators moving from a 
no-election condition (prior to the passage of the 17th amendment) to an 
election condition (after the passage of the 17th amendment).  This will allow 
for a more positive relationship to develop between constituency preferences 
and Senate roll call voting behavior, measured on a liberal/conservative 
dimension after the ratification of the 17th amendment.   
 
Secondary Hypothesis  
 
H2:  The relationship between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting  
       behavior will be stronger and more positive among the states that agitated   

































PRIOR APPROACHES AND METHODLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES 
TO MEASURING CONSTITUENT IDEOLOGY 
 
In order to analyze the relationship between constituency policy preferences and 
roll call behavior on the part of the legislators it is necessary to have measures of both 
concepts.  Roll call data are assessable for both the state and federal legislative bodies.  
Perhaps best known in these studies, is Poole and Rosenthal’s extensive database of roll 
call votes and member ideology scores spanning the entire history of Congress.  Public 
access to this database has made measuring the dependent variable in these types of 
studies much less challenging then finding adequate independent variables to measure 
constituency preferences.  A lack of resources, both monetary and otherwise, has made it 
exceedingly difficult to obtain efficient and unbiased estimators of district ideology.  
 In the face of this, researchers have created a number of surrogates.  These 
include demographic indicators (Ardoin and Garand, 2003; Froman, 1963), presidential 
election results (LeoGrande and Jeydel, 1997; Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986), 
referenda votes (Kuklinski, 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski, 1979), aggregated survey data 
(Miller and Stokes, 1963; Wright, Erickson and McIver, 1987; Wright, 1989) and 
simulations of opinion (Erickson 1978; Sullivan and Minns, 1976)   
Demographic Variables  
 Political scientists often rely on demographic indicators to measure the ideology 
of constituencies and to tease out district level policy preferences.  These indicators are 
often obtained from U.S. Census data and may include such variables as education, race, 
population density, home ownership, age and income.   
 In an effort to provide evidence that differences in Democratic and Republican 
voting behavior are not solely based on party or ideology, Froman (1963), uses a number 
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of demographic variables to establish that inter-party differences are partially the result of 
differing constituencies.   Likewise, Ardoin and Garand (2003) use demographic 
variables to help create measures of state ideology, which were then used to generate 
ideology scores for each House district throughout the 1980s and 1990s.   
  Though many prominent research articles and books have used demographic 
variables in their models, it’s important to remember that in order to do so the authors 
had to make some implicit assumptions about their connection to actual policy 
preferences.  Some of these assumptions are risky and may not be well supported by 
quantitative evidence. 
“In particular, one assumes that (1) individuals’ demographic 
characteristics are related systematically to their policy preferences, (2) 
legislators are aware of the demographic composition of their districts and 
take those characteristics (or at least how they interpret those 
characteristics) into account when making roll call decisions, and (3) such 
a relationship holds when one moves across levels of analysis (i.e. from 
the individual level to the aggregate level).” 
       
-Ardoin and Garand, 2003 
 Though demographic variables, such as those listed above, can be helpful in 
explaining some variation they are not without their flaws.  No demographic 
characteristic will be perfectly correlated with district-level policy preferences.  Just as 
legislators rely on cues outside of the makeup of their district, so should a researcher, 
when possible, work to improve the predictive power of their model by adding other 
estimators in along with their demographic indicators.   
Presidential Elections  
Presidential election results are often used independently or along with 
demographic characteristics as a way of defining the ideology or policy preferences of 
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constituencies.  These types of studies were particularly popular in the 1980s as a wealth 
of literature came out using presidential election results as a proxy for constituency 
ideology.  The underling idea behind its usage is that voters employ their ideological 
viewpoints as a tool in the process of determining which candidate to support with their 
vote on Election Day.  Thus, by aggregating election results in each state, one can gain a 
depiction of district ideology.  Unfortunately, presidential election results may not mirror 
the atmosphere of state or local politics where ideological returns may be much closer 
and diverse.  Further, outside environmental factors and forces, such as the state of the 
economy or a war, may have an affect on election results that would not occur if these 
causes were not present.  Finally, as Ardoin and Garand (2003) point out, presidential 
elections are not all created equal.  Some elections are much more ideologically focused 
then others (see also, Rabinowitz, Gurian and MacDonald, 1984.)          
 Just as with demographic characteristics, referenda results also contain implicit 
assumptions.  “In particular, one assumes, “(a) that short-term factors determining the 
vote have a fairly uniform effect across sub-national constituencies and (2) that 
constituency ideology is the only significant long-term factor affecting the vote 
(Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986).”   
 In Rabinowitz, Gurian and MacDonald (1984) the authors estimate a spatial 
model of state presidential election results from 1944-1980.  They find that party and 
ideology are the principal structural elements in elections.  This finding provides support 
for the argument that elections may be an adequate means of examining state or district 
ideology.   
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LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997), use principal component analysis to examine 
whether partisanship and ideology will remain as underlying forces in state presidential 
elections results over the 1960-1992 period.  Their results mirror those of Rabinowitz, 
Gurian and MacDonald.  However, they find that highly ideological elections tend to 
provide better proxies of constituency ideology and recommend examining election 
results over a number of elections in order to create more reliable estimates.   
Referenda Voting  
In lieu of these drawbacks, some scholars have resorted to referenda votes as a 
way of getting at district preferences and ideology.  Unfortunately, few states have 
referenda elections and this makes creating a measure to represent constituency opinion 
across every state utterly impossible.   
Kuklinski (1977) uses voting returns in California to analyze district 
competitiveness across three policy dimensions: contemporary liberalism, taxation and 
government administration.  In the former study Kuklinski finds varied support for the 
effect of competitive districts and party position on the relationship between district 
opinion and roll call behavior.  In the later article, McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) find 
that district opinion can be a powerful determinant of roll call behavior if the 
representative feels he is a delegate, if the policy issue has saliency and if the 
constituency provides clear policy cues.   
Aggregated Survey Data  
 For a period in the 1980’s, a number of articles came out which used aggregated 
public opinion surveys to capture ideology at the state level.  Prior to this, Miller and 
Stokes (1963) used small sample surveys as a way to gain proxy measures of ideology.  
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They interviewed a sample of constituents in each congressional district, as well as, the 
Congressmen themselves and then examined three policy domains.  They found that 
House members tend to vote along with their perceptions of constituency views, as well 
as, with their own individual views in these three domain areas. 
 Wright, Erickson and McIver (1987) aggregate CNS News/New York Times 
national opinion surveys to construct a measure of public opinion and ideological 
positions within the states.  They find that state opinion plays a major factor in helping to 
determine state policy and that these preferences play a greater role than either social or 
economic factors.   
             Finally Wright (1989), using these same aggregated surveys, makes an effort to 
examine what types of group or constituencies Senators represent.  They find that 
Senators listen most to the policy views of party elites and Independents.  Further, their 
results show that partisan ideology has little to no effect on senatorial decision-making.  
In short, each individual constituency may have a unique influence on a member that is 
divorced from the type of effect another constituency might have on the same member. 
 Unfortunately, using survey results such as these, or more commonly, American 
National Election Studies to get at district level public opinion is impossible given that no 
surveys were conducted around the turn of the century.  Even today, survey usage is 
problematic due to small sample sizes, language barriers and difficulties with measuring 
concepts and wording questions.   
Simulations of Opinion 
 Computer simulation techniques have also been developed in several research 
pieces to test the linkage between constituency policy preferences and voting behavior.  
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These techniques are typically refereed to as “top down” or “bottom up” simulation 
approaches.  A “top down” approach occurs when data is taken from a higher level of 
aggregation to simulate opinion at a lower level.  A “bottom up” approach is used when 
data is taken from a lower level of aggregation to simulate opinion at a higher level of 
aggregation (Ardoin and Garand, 2003).  Here, a “top down” model may approximate 
constituent ideology from the state-level to the district-level while a “bottom up” model 
may approximate ideology from the individual-level to the district or state-level.   
Sullivan and Minns (1976) use simulation to create measures for ideological 
opinion in 32 states.  They find that party preference, rather than issue preference, affects 
a candidate’s ideological positioning in an election and, in turn, voter behavior. 
Like Sullivan and Minns, Erikson (1978) uses simulation to measure constituency 
opinion.  His concludes that partisan candidates tend to have a higher probability of 
electoral success if their views are in-line with their constituents.  Comparing his results 
with those of Miller and Stokes, he finds higher correlations between constituency 
opinion and congressional behavior.    
Like the aforementioned approaches, these methods have not escaped without 
some degree of criticism.  Higher levels of random error may plague “bottom up” 
approaches because individual-level data is more likely to suffer from measurement error 
than that at the aggregate level (Ardoin and Garand, 2003).  On the other hand, “top 
down” approaches can inflate the importance of key figures or hierarchical control while 





DATA AND METHODS    
Few question the difficulty associated with measuring constituency ideology.  It 
seems that regardless of the method used, there are numerous drawbacks or incentives 
associated with it.  Unfortunately, a number of the aforementioned methods can’t be 
utilized effectively for the time period under study here.   
The 17th Amendment was passed in 1912 and the ratification process was 
completed on April 8, 1913.  In order to encompass the time period prior to and after the 
amendment’s passage I select a time series from the 51st Congress (1889-1891) to the 76th 
Congress (1939-1941).  This time period allows me to examine representation under two 
distinct partisan eras: Republican from 1889-1924 and Democratic from 1932-1941 
(Edwards, Wattenberg and Lineberry, 2002).     
The dependent variable in the model is the liberal-conservative ideology scores of 
Senators as created by Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE program.  Eliminating non-
conflict votes, they establish an 85% predictive accuracy across all roll call votes.  The 
authors have found that Senator ideology scores have remained very stable over the first 
dimensional structure of roll call voting which makes them an ideal measure for this type 
of historical analysis.   
Some states are excluded in the Poole and Rosenthal database during parts of this 
time period because of their date of entry into statehood.  These include Arizona (which 
gained statehood in 1912), New Mexico (which gained statehood in 1912) and Oklahoma 
(which gained statehood in 1907).  Estimates for Alaska and Hawaii (which both earned 
statehood in 1959) were excluded from Poole and Rosenthal’s dataset for the entire time 
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period under focus here.  In addition, some states lack full representation due to 
legislative deadlocks, which generate periodic vacancies in the dataset.   
Several independent variables are also included in the model to estimate the 
ideology of the 48 states.  These variables have been cited in several scholarly works as 
possible surrogates for mass state ideology.  One component of constituent ideology can be 
examined using census estimates.  In my model I use the following variables to estimate 
ideology at the state level: population density, percent of the population that is black, 
percent homeownership rate, and percent metropolitan.  (For a complete and detailed list of 
the variables used in my dataset see Appendix 1).   
The data for these variables are supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau and are 
obtained from a special report on demographic trends in the 20th century compiled by 
Hobbs and Stoops, which was issued in 2002.  The data span from 1900-1940.   
Unfortunately, due to data availability issues (a fire occurred in 1921 which destroyed or 
damaged a significant portion of the census records for 1890) I am unable to obtain 
compatible measures for several variables within the dataset from 1900-1940 (Blake, 
1996).  As a result, I exclude the 1890 census estimates from my analysis.  In addition, 
data was only available for the percent metropolitan variable from 1910-1940 and 
population density is used as a surrogate for the first decade under analysis.  
In accordance with these variables, I hypothesize that homeownership and the size 
of the black population should be positively related to state conservatism (except in the 
South where blacks were largely disenfranchised and whites voted overwhelmingly 
Democratic) while the percentage of the population living in metropolitan areas should be 
negatively related to state conservatism.  It has been noted that prior to the black 
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realignment in the 1930’s, Northern blacks voted Republican in greater numbers (Bolce, 
Maio, Muzzio, 1992).  Thus, only in the last five to ten years of my dataset do I expect to 
see the Democratic Party becoming increasingly synonymous with the black vote.  Next, 
from the mid to late 19th century through the early 20th century, urban political machines 
frequently ran politics in the big cities and these machines were often seen as instruments 
for immigrants and the poor (Stone, 1996).  Though these machines were sustained more 
through patronage than ideology, many were tied to the Democratic Party.  Finally, 
throughout history the Democratic Party has been associated with blue-collar workers 
while the Republican Party has been considered a champion of the well to do.  Using 
home ownership as a surrogate for income I assume that states with a high rate of home 
ownership may exhibit more conservative attributes then those with lower levels of 
ownership.   
In order to create a more precise measure of state ideology and to obtain more 
data reference points throughout this time period, presidential election results for each 
state are included in the analysis from 1892-1936.  By combining these estimates of 
liberalism-conservatism with other state demographic characteristics one can gain a more 
accurate picture of true constituency preferences and raise the predictive power of the 
model.  The data for this variable was obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections.   
 I follow the standard measure of the Republican presidential vote.  This variable 
is computed as the, “average percentage of the vote for Republican candidates” in a given 
election.  I hypothesize that representatives who have a very high or very low average 
percentage of the vote going to Republicans will send more clear policy cues to their 
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representative.  In turn, these representative’s ideology scores will more closely reflect 
those of their constituency.  Further, I expect to find that this variable has a positive 
relationship to state ideology.  I reason that states with high Republican support scores 
will be less apt to deviate from the conservative position (except in the South).   
In an effort to further define the ideology of the states under consideration I 
examine the party composition of popularly elected government institutions in the states, 
these being the governorship1 and the upper and lower houses of the state legislature.  In 
so doing, I aim to gain a better understanding of the partisan climate within each state.   
The governorship data was obtained from a variety of websites (see Appendix 2) and Dr. 
Brian Gaines at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champagne graciously provided the 
data for the state legislatures.  This data spans from the 51st to the 76th Congress and 
throughout this time period a serious effort is made to match up the session lengths of 
these institutions and officeholders with each session of Congress.  For the governorship 
data, each session of Congress is coded according to which party held the governor’s 
seat.  When two different parties controlled the governorship during a given Congress the 
party who held the office the longest was designated for that session.  Only when the 
governorship was split equally between one session of Congress was the session coded to 
denote the power sharing that took place.  For the state legislative data, each session of 
Congress is coded according to the average of the partisan split within the upper and 
lower chambers of each state.   
                                                 
1 I collect data on gubernatorial party control because governors can exert a great deal of influence over the 
legislature and its agenda.  In addition, occasionally the governor appointed senators when a state 
legislature was unable to come to a consensus, although, in these instances the governor’s appointment 
power was typically overturned by the courts or rejected by the senate (Hall, 1936).        
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Given this, my model, which is constructed to estimate state ideology scores for 
all the states included in Poole and Rosenthal’s D-NOMINATE dataset is constructed as 
follows:  
 
D-NOMINATE= a + b1 (average Republican Presidential vote) + b2 (% black)                  
+ b3 (% home ownership) + b4 (% metropolitan population) + b5 (party control of 
the governorship + party control of the upper and lower house in the state 
legislature)  
 
In addition, a unique quasi-experiment is conducted by comparing states that were 
active in the movement for popular elections prior to the amendment’s ratification against 
those that were largely dormant.  This level of activity is comprised by combining 
information on each state’s involvement, where applicable, with direct primary 
legislation, referenda, congressional joint resolutions, memorials from state legislatures 
and petitions from organized and unorganized citizens (see Hall, 1936; Merriam and 
Overacker, 1928; Merriam, 1908; Haynes, 1906 and 1938).  By selecting these measures 
I represent the activity level across the three key dimensions in each state: Congress, state 
legislatures and the public.  The activity level on each of these dimensions is accounted 
for from the 1800’s to the early 1900’s and then totaled.  The states are then broken up 
into three classification groups based on their total number of activities.  A state is 
classified as low if they conducted eight or fewer activities, mid if they conducted 
between nine and 19 activities and high if they conducted 20 or more.  Each state’s 
classification division can be found in Appendix 3.   
21 
 
I reason that states which were more active in agitating for the amendment and 
had some level of participation by the public in senate elections prior to the ratification 
will be more apt to exhibit a positive trend in representative-constituent ideological 























The data analysis in this paper covers a time series from 1889-1941 with the 
intervention point set in 1913 (the year the 17th amendment was ratified).  The selection 
of this time frame was designed so that enough time is allotted for Senators from both the 
Republican and the Democratic parties to have transitioned from a condition of no 
electoral threat to one of constant electoral risk.   
 In order to fully capture the variation in the independent variables over the 52-
year time span the analysis was broken down into sections.   To begin, I estimate 
regression models for each presidential election year using the senator’s 
DWNOMINATE score as the dependent variable and the Republican presidential vote 
and state party control (Republican control of the governorship and state legislature) as 
the independent variables. 
Table 1: Regression estimates for models of senator ideology by presidential election 
year 
 
      Constant           GOP Presidential Vote          State Party Control    
   
    b             t                    b       t  b      t  N R2 
 
 
1892           -0.238        -2.62***        0.224     0.97            0.125   9.72*** 181 .551 
  
 
1896           -0.038        -0.45   0.057     0.30            0.117   9.21***              182        .497 
 
 
1900           -0.300        -3.16***        0.692     3.35***         0.111          10.68***            175         .711 
 
 
1904           -0.097        -1.19   0.244    1.45*              0.131   11.16***            174        .725 
 
 
1908           -0.243        -2.39***        0.628      2.96***          0.095            7.77***             201       .519 
 
  





Table 1 Continued 
 
1916          -0.310         -3.48***        0.773      3.49***          0.057            4.86***             203       .370 
 
 
1920     -0.359        -2.89***         0.808      3.43***         0.046            3.10***              202       .333 
 
  
1924      -0.584        -6.34***         1.364      6.77***         0.020            1.57*                  200       .432 
 
 
1928     -0.232        -1.95**           0.513      2.42***         0.075            7.64***              211       .371 
 
 
1932     -0.230        -3.59***         0.684      4.42***         0.044            4.72***              196       .301 
 
 




**  prob<.05 
  *  prob<.10 
 Although the pattern is not perfect, over time we can see some support for my 
primary hypothesis.  Beginning with the Republican presidential vote one can see that 
prior to 1900 this variable was not significant and only weakly related to the 
conservativeness of senators.  This is not surprising given that the first eight years saw 
only building state agitation for the amendment and most Senators were not presented 
with an incentive to be responsive.  Between 1908 and 1912 states were increasingly 
adopting the Oregon Plan or had some form of direct election in place spurring senators 
to become more attentive to their newly voting publics.  This is reflected in the high 
levels of significance for this variable.  In 1916 the first elections for Senators are held 
and the relationship between the Republican presidential vote and the conservatism of 
senators remains very significant until 1936.  Next, looking at the state party control 
variable we see much the same effect in reverse.  Here, the relationship between 
Republican control at the state level and the conservatism of senators is very strong prior 
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to the first senate elections in 1916.  Although, this relationship retains is significance 
level following these elections the coefficients only reach the level experienced prior to 
1916 once (in 1928).   
 These results demonstrate that after the ratification of the 17th amendment, 
Senators are listening more to the voters and less to the elites.  This provides support for 
my primary hypothesis, which stated that legislative responsiveness would increase as a 
result of Senators moving from a no-election condition to an election condition.   
 In order to visualize the trend in table one across time I generate a figure that plots 
the regression coefficients for both the presidential vote and state party control variables 
by presidential election year.   




















 Here we can see that the general trend in the presidential vote variable is upward 
while the party control variable is moving slightly downward.  Furthermore, we can see 
that the coefficients for the presidential vote are much larger than those for party control; 
demonstrating the heightened importance of the public in determining the 
conservativeness of senators.   
Before moving on to estimating panel models I tested the level of variance for 
each state.  To do this, I generated graphs plotting the state party control variable by 
presidential election year for each state.  I also ran a regression model for presidential 
election year against my state party control variable for each state.  The following states 
showed no movement along the x-axis and returned no regression statistics and were 
subsequently dropped from the rest of the analysis, as these states proved unable to 
respond to my leverage variables: Vermont, Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Oklahoma. 
 After examining the relationship between senator and constituent ideology for 
each presidential election year I estimate a pooled cross-sectional time-series (panel) 
model to capture the effect.  For this model constituent ideology is represented by the 
Republican presidential vote, state party control and three census variables (percent 
metropolitan, percent black and percent home ownership).    The South is excluded from 











Table 2: Panel estimates for senator ideology for the non south excluding non 
varying states 
  
                    (1) 
            
                                b      t  
      
 
 
Intercept     0.167  0.98 
 
 
GOP Presidential Vote (+)    0.206  2.06** 
 
State Party Control (+)    0.009  1.13 
 
Percent Metropolitan (-)    0.000  0.24 
 
Percent Black (+)                 -0.014              -2.14** 
 




N       336 




**  prob<.05 
              *    prob<.10 
 
Here, we can see that the Republican presidential vote is significantly related to 
the conservativeness of senators, providing further support for my primary hypothesis.  
The state party control variable does not exhibit any degree of significance, which 
demonstrates that the elites do not have the same amount of influence on the 
conservativeness of senators as the public does.  Only the percent homeownership 
variable is correctly signed but does not reach any level of significance.  
Next, I estimate a panel model to examine how the relationship between senator 
and constituent ideology changes after the ratification of the 17th amendment.  Once 
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again, the model is ran excluding the South and Vermont, which exhibited no variance in 
earlier tests.   
 
Table 3: Panel estimates for senator ideology in the pre-post ratification periods for 
the non south excluding non varying states 
 
 
      Prior to Ratification          After Ratification 
  




Intercept    1.003              1.05  0.041  0.22  
 
 
GOP Presidential Vote (+)               -0.143             -0.09               0.343  2.72*** 
 
State Party Control (+)                0.114              5.92***               0.003  0.37  
 
Percent Metropolitan (-)               -0.003             -1.50*              -0.000              -0.24 
 
Percent Black (+)                -0.008             -0.82              -0.012                -1.74** 
 




N        41     295 




**  prob<.05 
*    prob<.10 
 
 This table provides strong support for my primary hypothesis.  Here, the 
Republican presidential vote goes from a point prior to the amendment where the more 
conservative voters where the less conservative senators were to a point after the 
ratification where senate and constituent conservativeness is strongly aligned and highly 
significant.  The state party control variable shows that prior to the amendment the 
conservativeness of the elites in the state were strongly tied to the conservativeness of 
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senators.  After the ratification of the 17th amendment this effect reduces substantially 
and the variable does not retain its significance.   After the ratification of the 17th 
amendment, the presence of a metropolitan area has less of an effect on the 
conservativeness of senators.  The percent black variable is signed incorrectly and 
follows more traditional understandings of the tie between African Americans and 
conservatism.  The percent home ownership variable does move in the correct direction 
after ratification of the 17th amendment but does not achieve statistical significance.     
Finally, I ran a panel model to test my secondary hypothesis that the relationship 
between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior will be stronger 
and more positive among the states that agitated for the popular election of senators prior 
to the amendment’s ratification.  This model was run with all non-varying states 
excluded.  Here, constituent ideology is a factor of two variables, the Republican 
presidential vote and state party control. 
 
Table 4: Panel estimates for senator ideology by agitation level excluding non 
varying states 
 
                 High Agitation                          Medium Agitation                Low Agitation 
    
       b        t   b t    b       t 
 
 
Intercept                 0.035      0.81                          0.033 0.84              0.167        3.90*** 
   
 
GOP Pres. Vote (+)             0.039        0.54                            0.010          0.16              0.149        0.24   
 




N         599          547             642 
Psuedo R                                 .299         .265            .278 
 
***prob<.01 
**  prob<.05 
*   prob<.10 
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The results provide partial support for my hypothesis.  It’s important to note 
before examining these results that prior to this moment my hypothesis suggested that 
state party control should go down in importance and the presidential vote should go up 
as a function of the elites having less control over the appointment process of senators 
and the public having more.  In short, Senators are becoming more responsive to the 
people and less to the state elites.  Here, the same reasoning holds for the presidential 
vote but not for the state party control variable.  Since agitation is a function of the 
activity in Congress, in the state legislatures and among the public both of these variables 
should play a stronger role in states where agitation is high.  In short, Senators are likely 
to be more conservative in states where both a conservative public and a conservative 
group of elites are pushing for the amendment.   
To begin, while the Republican presidential vote has the greatest effect on the 
conservativeness of senators in states that were actively agitating for the amendment it 
has its next biggest effect in states whose level of activism was largely dismal.  
Moreover, in none of these agitation levels does the presidential vote reach significance.  
However, looking at state party control we see that the degree of Republicanism among 
the state elites played a much stronger role in the states that agitated for the amendment, 








CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
In conclusion, I found some support for both my primary and secondary 
hypotheses.  My primary hypothesis stated that a positive relationship should develop 
between constituency preferences and Senate roll call voting behavior after the 
ratification of the 17th amendment.  As evidence of this, between the 51st and the 76th 
Congress, the conservatism of the voters is shown to have a significant effect on the 
conservatism of senators while the conservatism of the elites does not demonstrate any 
significant effect.  Furthermore, following the ratification of the amendment in 1913, the 
relationship between the voters and the senators is very pronounced while the relationship 
between the state elites and the senators becomes insignificant.  Both of these findings 
provide evidence that legislative responsiveness has increased as a result of senators 
moving from a no-election condition to a state of constant electoral threat.  As 
hypothesized, Senators are paying more attention to the ideology of the voters then to that 
of the governor and the upper and lower chambers of the state legislature.     
I found only partial support for my secondary hypothesis, which argued that the 
relationship between characteristics of the state electorate and the roll call behavior of 
U.S. Senators would become stronger and more positive among the states that voiced 
their desire for the amendment the loudest prior to the amendment’s ratification.  I found 
that voter ideology was not significantly related to senate ideology at any of the agitation 
levels.  However, the degree of Republicanism among the state elites played a much 
stronger role in the states that agitated for the amendment, as hypothesized.    
 It’s important to note here that measuring constituent ideology is an imperfect 
process.  Researchers have used a number of surrogates to try to get at ideology, and 
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although they have been accepted as reasonable approximates in the literature they are 
not flawless.  Given the historical time period under consideration I was unable to fall 
back on contemporary measures of ideology, such as public opinion polls or aggregated 
survey data.  Therefore, this paper makes the best use of the data available given the 
constraints and methodological challenges presented.   
These aforementioned results are important because they establish a link between 
representatives and their constituents and demonstrate that representatives do not exist in 
a vacuum and that, even though other internal and external forces may put pressures on 
members, a representative’s constituency does play an important factor in their voting 
decisions.     
As the next step in this project, I plan to add in a seniority variable with the data I 
have collected on each Senator’s term length from the 51st to the 76th Congress.  In this 
manner I hope to examine whether incumbency has an effect on senatorial 
responsiveness.  I also plan to examine turnover levels across this time period to see 
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Variable    Description 
 
 
Congress    Session of Congress – Ranging from 51 to 76 
 
Presidential Election Year  The year each presidential election was held – Ranging 
     from 1888 to 1936 
 
Pre-Post Amendment 0 = prior to ratification of the 17th amendment 1 = after 
ratification of the 17th amendment  
 
Ratification 0 = before ratification of the 17th amendment 1 = after 
ratification of the 17th amendment 3 = amendment never 
ratified 4 = amendment rejected  
 
State Agitation Variable was estimated for each state by summing the 
number of congressional joint resolutions proposed on 
the direction election of senators from 1820-1910, the 
list of memorials from state legislatures from 1870-1910 
and the citizen petitions for popular elections from 1880-
1910.    1 = high agitation 2 = medium agitation 3=low 
agitation  
 
DWNOMINATE Dimension 1 Approximates a Senators ideology through roll call votes 
– Ranges from –1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative) 
 
Population Density   Calculated by dividing the total population by land   
area (people per square mile or square kilometer of land 
area)  
 
Percent Black Calculated by dividing the total black population from 
the total population. 
 
Percent Home Ownership Rate  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “The proportion 
of households that are owner occupied.  It is computed 
by dividing the number of owner-occupied housing units 
by the total number of occupied housing units, times 
100.” 
 
Percent Metro According to the U.S. Census Bureau, a metropolitan 
district can be defined as, “A statistical area comprising 
a central city and adjacent incorporated places, densely 
settled Minor Civil Divisions (MCDs) and, in some 
cases, enumeration districts (EDs). It was used in the 
1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 decennial censuses (with 




State Party Control Ranges from –3 (Democratic control of the upper and 
lower chamber and governorship) to 3 (Republican 
control of the upper and lower chamber and 
governorship). 
 
Republican Presidential Vote  Calculated as the Republican raw vote divided by  
the total vote per state.  
  
Region2    1 = North 2 = Midwest 3 = South 4 = West 
 
No Variance 0 = state varies across presidential election years on the 
state party control dimension 1 = the state does not vary 
across presidential elections on the state party control 

























                                                 
2 Northern states are designated as follows: ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA, NJ, DE and MD.  
Midwestern states are designated as follows: OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, IA, MO, KS, and NE.  Southern 
states are designated as follows: OK, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, LA, AR, TX, TN and KY.  
Western states are designated as follows: CA, OR, NV, CO, ND< SD< MT, WA, ID, WY, UT, AZ and 




PARTY CONTROL DATA SOURCES 
The party control data on the governor was collected from a variety of websites.  
The primary source for this information was the NNDB, which is “an intelligence 
aggregator” that tracks the activities of noteworthy individuals both alive and deceased.  
This source provided data for 38 states on each governor’s name, birth date, date of 
death, party affiliation and term length.  In the case of ten states (UT, WY, WA, RI, VT, 
TN, WV, WI, SD and VA) data was not available from the NNDB.  Thus, for these ten 
states, data on the aforementioned variables was collected from the following resources: 
The Rhode Island Office of the Secretary of State, The Official Website of the State of 
Tennessee, The West Virginia Division of Culture and History, The Official Website of 
the State of Utah, The South Dakota State Historical Society, The Official 
Commonwealth of Virginia Home Page, The Wyoming Secretary of State’s Website, 
Washington State Digital Library Resources, World Statesmen and The Knapp House.  












STATE AGITATION CLASSIFICATION 
 
 States within these Agitation 
Divisions 
Low AL, AZ, CT, DE, FL, GA, LA, ME, 
MD, MA, MS, NH, NJ, NM, ND, 
RI, SC, UT, VT, VA, WV, WY 
Mid 
 
AR, CA, CO, ID, KY, MN, MT, 
NE, NC, OK, PA, SD, TX, WA 
High 
 
IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MO, NY, OH, 
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